The price discovery mechanism for crypto assets fundamentally differs from traditional financial markets. In conventional markets, prices are shaped by the interplay between a broad base of buyers and sellers, with liquidity dispersed across multiple independent market makers. In the crypto market, however, top market makers control the vast majority of token liquidity. When a single institution adjusts its positions, it often triggers sharp price swings. On April 10, 2026, the PARTI token plummeted 63% within a few hours. The close correlation between on-chain data and market timing brought this core industry issue into the spotlight once again. At the time of writing, PARTI is trading at $0.0486, with the 24-hour decline narrowing to 45%.
The primary function of a market maker is to simultaneously place buy and sell orders on both sides of the order book, earning profits from the bid-ask spread while providing liquidity to the market. Take Wintermute as an example: this institution offers liquidity services on more than 50 exchanges, with cumulative trading volume nearing $3.7 trillion by the end of 2023. Under normal market conditions, market makers use high-frequency trading algorithms to keep spreads stable. Their delta-neutral strategies aim to eliminate directional price risk. However, this approach has structural flaws: when token prices hit preset thresholds or the market maker’s risk model determines that position risk exceeds acceptable limits, rebalancing can create intense short-term selling pressure.
On-Chain Timeline: Wintermute Hot Wallet Transfers and PARTI Price Crash
Crypto influencer Gorkeu pointed out in the early hours of April 10, 2026, that the PARTI token crash was directly linked to market maker Wintermute. On-chain data shows that, in the hours leading up to the price collapse, Wintermute transferred a large amount of PARTI tokens from its labeled hot wallet. This was followed by aggressive selling, causing the token price to drop 63% in a short period. The timing of these transfers—preceding the price drop—forms the core evidence for causal inference. From an on-chain data perspective, if selling pressure originates from spontaneous market activity, large transfers to exchanges typically occur during or after the price decline. Wintermute’s transfers happened before the drop, making the "hot wallet token transfer triggers market sell-off" explanation plausible from a timing standpoint.
It’s worth noting that Wintermute faced similar scrutiny during the ACT token flash crash in April 2025. At the time, Wintermute’s founder responded that the selling was to arbitrage price discrepancies in AMM pools, and the actions took place after the price had already swung sharply—not as an intentional dump. In the PARTI incident, however, the time gap between hot wallet transfers and the price crash was shorter, and the drop steeper, making the "arbitrage-driven rebalancing" explanation less convincing.
Profit Logic and Historical Patterns of Leading Market Makers
Wintermute’s market-making model is far more sophisticated than simply earning the spread through two-way orders. Analyzing its historical operations reveals that the firm employs complex strategy combinations when making markets for tokens. For example, in the case of griffain and other tokens, Wintermute first negotiates with current token holders—borrowing tokens from project teams or whales—and simultaneously buys call options to hedge risk. After borrowing tokens, Wintermute sells them in the market, establishing a de facto short position. As selling drives the price down, the firm buys back tokens at a lower price to return to the lender, profiting from the decline. Market makers can profit both when prices fall and rise.
The community has dubbed this price movement pattern the "Wintermute Model": high opening price, selling off, wash trading, accumulation, and then pumping again. According to crypto influencer dethective’s analysis, 67% of tokens traded by Wintermute have experienced price declines. Over the past year, investors who followed Wintermute’s positions or held those tokens saw an average return of -26%. Gorkeu further noted that Wintermute used similar methods to liquidate around 10 projects last year.
Compounding Effects: Token Unlocks, Circulating Supply, and Sell Pressure
The PARTI token crash didn’t happen in a vacuum. On March 25, 2026, Particle Network carried out a major token unlock, releasing about 89.3 million PARTI tokens—19.86% of the circulating supply, worth approximately $7.81 million. This unlock occurred just two weeks before the April 10 crash. From a microstructure perspective, large unlocks typically increase tradable supply in the secondary market in the short term. The thinner the liquidity, the greater the marginal impact of new supply on price.
When structural supply increases coincide with large transfers by leading market makers within the same time window, the logic chain behind price pressure becomes clearer. It’s important to note that token unlocks are planned events in a project’s tokenomics, and the market usually prices them in ahead of time. However, the actual flow of unlocked tokens—especially whether they enter the secondary market via market makers—is the key variable determining the strength of price impact. In this case, Wintermute’s hot wallet transfers happened after the unlock, making it impossible to rule out a causal link between the two.
Price Recovery, Volume Surge, and Subsequent Market Performance
As of April 10, 2026, Gate market data shows that after the early-morning crash, PARTI rebounded to some extent. The 24-hour price volatility reached 173.2%, with a low of $0.0358, and the current price is around $0.0485. The 24-hour decline narrowed to 44.22%. The simultaneous surge in trading volume is a key clue: PARTI’s 24-hour volume jumped by over 900%, indicating strong buyer demand after the crash.
This price pattern—"rapid rebound after a crash, accompanied by volume expansion"—is not uncommon in crypto markets, but there are two possible interpretations. One is that panic selling flushed out overleveraged positions, and as price hit liquidity-starved levels, bargain hunters entered, triggering a technical rebound. The other is that market makers are buying back previously sold positions at the lows—if Wintermute sold borrowed tokens at high prices, buying them back after a steep drop to return to the lender is a key profit step in the "Wintermute Model." Since the aggregation of on-chain addresses and token flow paths remains opaque, neither scenario can be definitively confirmed at this time.
Liquidity Withdrawal by Market Makers: A Crisis of Trust
The PARTI crash is not Wintermute’s first time sparking market panic through large transfers, and it’s unlikely to be the last. During the October 2025 market meltdown, Wintermute moved over $700 million in assets to exchange hot wallets before the crash, causing dramatic liquidity shifts. In April of the same year, Wintermute’s on-chain addresses were tracked dumping ACT, BONK, BABYDOGE, and other altcoins and meme tokens, triggering collective price plunges. In March 2026, FTX estate wallets transferred 4.126 million ZRO tokens (about $8.17 million) to Wintermute, after which ZRO’s price dropped 6%.
These repeated incidents highlight a deeper structural issue in the crypto market: there is inherent tension between market makers’ commercial interests and market stability. The basic profit model for market makers is to earn spreads through high-frequency trading and cross-market arbitrage, which also provides liquidity under normal conditions. But in extreme markets, risk models may prompt them to withdraw liquidity or even liquidate positions, with effects similar to "dumping." Wintermute’s founder has said, "Market makers aren’t the new ‘bad guys’—people just need someone to blame," but also acknowledged the need for disclosure standards in market-making agreements to increase transparency.
The Future of Token Pricing Power: Market Maker Dynamics
Market makers play a dual role in token price formation—they provide liquidity and amplify price volatility—which has become a central governance issue in the crypto industry. From a project’s perspective, partnering with top market makers is essential for listing tokens on major exchanges and securing initial liquidity. For ordinary investors, however, this relationship can mean information asymmetry and opaque pricing mechanisms. Some analysts note that Wintermute’s market-making goes beyond direct trading in secondary markets, leveraging news, market trends, and other fronts simultaneously. Its style has evolved beyond simple order book management into a more complex game.
The evolution of token pricing power may follow two paths. One is for exchanges to standardize information disclosure by market makers—requiring them to publish token position changes and agreement terms—to narrow the information gap between institutions and retail investors. The other is the maturation of native DeFi market-making mechanisms, such as automated market makers (AMMs) and liquidity mining, which gradually weaken centralized market makers’ dominance over token pricing. Until then, the control top market makers exert over token prices remains a core variable in the structure of the crypto market.
Conclusion
The PARTI token’s 63% crash forms a logical chain across three dimensions: on-chain timing, token unlock context, and Wintermute’s historical patterns. Hot wallet transfers occurred before the price drop, large unlocks increased market supply flexibility, and Wintermute has shown recognizable operational patterns in similar incidents. The convergence of these clues provides strong logic for the explanation that "market makers proactively reduce positions, triggering price collapses." However, key information—such as agreement terms between market makers and projects, the specifics of token borrowing and repayment—remains a black box, making it difficult for outsiders to draw definitive conclusions from on-chain data. For market participants, understanding the role and incentive structure of market makers in token price formation may offer more long-term value than chasing the direct cause of a single crash.
FAQ
Q: What was the direct cause of PARTI’s 63% crash?
A: On-chain data shows that Wintermute’s hot wallet transferred a large amount of PARTI tokens hours before the crash, followed by aggressive selling that drove the price down 63% in a short period. The increased supply from token unlocks may have been a background factor.
Q: Has Wintermute carried out similar operations before?
A: Yes. In April 2025, Wintermute dumped ACT, BONK, BABYDOGE, and several other altcoins, causing market panic. In October of the same year, it moved over $700 million in assets ahead of a market crash. Gorkeu notes that Wintermute liquidated around 10 projects in a similar manner last year.
Q: Does market maker selling count as market manipulation?
A: Under current regulatory frameworks, position adjustments by market makers within the scope of market-making agreements are generally not directly classified as market manipulation. However, since agreement terms are not publicly disclosed, outsiders cannot judge whether specific selling actions exceed reasonable bounds. Wintermute’s founder has publicly called for industry-wide disclosure standards for market-making agreements.
Q: Has PARTI’s price recovered after the crash?
A: As of April 10, 2026, PARTI rebounded from a low of about $0.03546 to around $0.04943. The 24-hour decline was about 44.22%, with volatility reaching 173.2%, and trading volume surged by over 900%.
Q: How can investors avoid similar risks?
A: Monitor large on-chain holder position changes, understand the token’s market maker background and unlock schedule, and avoid using high leverage on illiquid assets. For tokens heavily held by market makers, maintain extra risk buffers for price volatility.
